Virtual Child Pornography as a New Category of Unprotected Speech by Guglielmi, Kelly
VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AS A NEW CATEGORY OF
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Kelly Guglielmi
In the '60s and '70s, the nation found itself in
the middle of a revolution. Music was changing,
equality began to become a reality and sex be-
came an anthem for a generation breaking free of
the Leave it to Beaver stereotypes. It was during this
revolution that the Supreme Court First Amend-
ment jurisprudence began to evolve largely in re-
sponse to the thousands of individuals speaking
out against the Vietnam War. This generation
brought about vast changes in society, which in-
cluded an increasing acceptance of hard-core por-
nography.1
The Supreme Court did not follow the nation's
youth in embracing hard-core pornography. Al-
though the Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Geor-
gia2 that a state could not ban the in-home posses-
sion of obscenity,3 in Miller v. California4 it
reaffirmed its previous holdings that obscenity
was not protected by the First Amendment. 5
About ten years later, in New York v. Ferber,6 the
Court furthered the state's ability to regulate sex-
I See United States v. Stevens, 29 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595 n.4
(D. Alaska 1998), vacated by 197 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1999).
2 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3 Id. at 568.
4 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5 Id. at 36-37.
6 458 U.S. 747 (1982), affd, 57 N.Y.2d 256 (1982).
7 Id. at 757.
8 Id. at 756.
9 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
10 Id. at 111.
11 See id. at 110; see also FINAL REPORT OF THE ATr'Y GEN.'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 406, 410 (1986) [hereinafter
AI-r'v GEN.'s COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY] (concluding
that the Supreme Court's decision in Ferber forced the pro-
duction of child pornography underground where it has be-
come a "cottage industry").
12 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
'3 See id.
14 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,
Pub. L. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). In United States v. Kimbrough,
the defense argued that the government was required to
show that each image purporting to be child pornography
ually explicit material when it upheld a state law
proscribing the distribution and production of
child pornography. 7 The Court granted states tre-
mendous leeway in regulating child pornography,
which allows them the proper tools to protect the
nation's children from sexual abuse.8 Later, in Os-
borne v. Ohio,9 the Court held that a statute ban-
ning the possession of child pornography was con-
stitutional. 10
After the Supreme Court's decision in Ferber,
the child pornography industry was forced under-
ground 1 and remained there until the Internet
provided pedophiles a new medium to trade their
pornographic pictures of children.' 2 In addition,
technological developments in computers have
enabled child pornography to be produced solely
by a computer.13 In response to this development,
Congress enacted the Child Pornography Preven-
tion Act ("CPPA") of 1996.14 The CPPA created a
new definition of child pornography that incorpo-
rated pictures generated on a computer.' 5 Con-
actually depicted a minor. Although the defense was not vic-
torious, Congress recognized that advances in technology will
make it almost impossible for prosecutors to convict individu-
als for possessing child pornography because they will not be
able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the image de-
picts an actual child. 69 F.3d 723, 733 (5th Cir. 1995).
15 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000). The CPPA defines child
pornography as:
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated im-
age or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit con-
duct, where:
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct;
(B) such visual'depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed in such a man-
ner that conveys the impression that the material is
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gress found that these images can cause many of
the same harms to children as actual child por-
nography and that these images further the sex-
ual exploitation of children.' 6
Congress' actions created uproar among schol-
ars arguing that virtual child pornography 7 is
protected speech.' The majority of courts, how-
ever, have disagreed, maintaining that Congress
has more power to regulate any form of child por-
nography because of the importance of protect-
ing the nation's children from sexual abuse. '
The answer to whether virtual child pornography
is protected speech begins with the question:
What did the Supreme Court intend child por-
nography to include when it held child pornogra-
phy was not protected by the First Amendment?
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in United States v. Hilton2 0 stated that regulation of
sexually explicit material could be viewed on a
continuum when speaking in terms of legal pro-
tection. 2' At one end of the continuum is adult
pornography22 and at the other end is child por-
nography. Falling somewhere in between is virtual
child pornography.23 The question is: To which
or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct.
Id. at § 2556(8).
16 See infra text accompanying note 139.
17 See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1098
n.1 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001). The
dissent divides computer-generated pornography into two
categories: virtual child pornography and computer-altered
child pornography. Virtual child pornography is defined as
an image that is 100% virtual whereas computer-altered
images use the face of an actual minor. The CPPA addresses
both issues, and therefore, this comment will refer to all
child pornography generated on a computer as virtual child
pornography. For clarification images that were made using
real children will be referred to as actual child pornography.
This distinction, however, is not meant to suggest that child
pornography created on a computer is a lesser form of child
pornography.
18 See, e.g., Debra D. Burke The Criminalization of Virtual
Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 339, 461 (1997) [hereinafter Burke]; Gary Geating, Ob-
scenity and Other Unprotected Speech: Free Speech Coalition v. Reno,
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 389, 395 (1998) [hereinafter Geat-
ing]; Brenda M. Simon, Child Pornography: United States v.
Hilton, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 385, 394 (1999) [hereinafter
Simon]; Samantha L. Friel, Porn by any Other Name: A Constitu-
tional Alternative to Regulating "Victimless" Computer-Cenerated
Child Pornography, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 229 (1997) [herein-
after Friel].
19 See, e.g., United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Carroll, 190 F.3d 290 (5th Cir.
1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999),
cert denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999). But see, Free Speech Coalition,
198 F.3d at 1095 (holding that virtual child pornography is
side does virtual child pornography fall closer?
Does it fall closer to the side of adult pornography
and thus gain more First Amendment protection?
Or, is it just another species of child pornography
to which the Supreme Court has already denied
protection? Perhaps, the answer is neither be-
cause virtual child pornography really is a new cat-
egory of unprotected speech.
This comment will place virtual child pornogra-
phy in its proper place on the continuum by es-
tablishing that it is a new category of unprotected
speech. Specifically, this comment will conclude
that virtual child pornography should be placed
between obscenity and real child pornography.
Part I of this comment will examine the develop-
ment of case law pertaining to the categories of
sexually explicit material that are not protected by
the First Amendment. It also will establish a meth-
odology for examining speech under the categori-
cal approach. Particularly, this comment will illus-
trate the differences between child pornography
and obscenity in an attempt to show that virtual
child pornography must lie somewhere between
both of these unprotected forms of speech in
protected speech).
21 167 F.3d 61.
21 Id. at 70.
22 This comment distinguishes between adult pornogra-
phy, including "hard-core" pornography, and obscenity for
purposes of clarity. Specifically, this comment will refer to
adult pornography only when discussing sexually explicit ma-
terial portraying adults that is protected by the First Amend-
ment. Obscenity, on the other hand, will refer to sexually ex-
plicit material that is unprotected by the free speech clause.
Obscenity is defined in Part L.B of this comment. Obscenity's
place on the continuum is discussed in Part I.D.
23 The third edition of the American Heritage Dictionary
defines a continuum as "a continuous extent or whole, no
part of which can be distinguished from neighboring parts
except by arbitrary division." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
189-90 (3d ed. 1994). The idea of a continuum of sexually
explicit material can be seen from varying angles. This com-
ment, however, will focus on the legal protection given to
certain types of sexually explicit speech and will rely on the
arbitrary boundaries between the varying types of speech.
The idea of a continuum also is a sound approach for ana-
lyzing sexually explicit material because it stresses the exis-
tence of arbitrary boundaries. For example, the continuum
could be used to illustrate the ambiguity and difficulty in
placing sexually explicit material into a specific category, i.e.
adult pornography versus obscenity. The fact that a type of
material reasonably may be concluded to be in two places on
the continuum does not significantly affect the continuum's
value. For example, the fact that child pornography also may
be obscene does not affect the outcome of this comment in
terms of where virtual child pornography should be placed
on the continuum.
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terms of legal protection. Part I also will lay out
Congress' findings relating to virtual child por-
nography and the CPPA's definition of child por-
nography.
Part II will illustrate the problems with applying
the Supreme Court's present definition of child
pornography to virtual child pornography, thus
concluding virtual child pornography is its own
category of speech. Part III will show that virtual
child pornography adds little value to the free ex-
pression of ideas. Part IV then examines the com-
mon governmental interests in prohibiting both
actual and virtual child pornography in order to
show that laws regulating virtual child pornogra-
phy rely on compelling governmental interests.
Part V will match the CPPA's definition of child
pornography to the definition the Supreme Court
created in Ferber and Osborne as a means to discern
what speech will be viewed as virtual child pornog-
raphy. Finally, Part V, in establishing the limits of
this new category of speech, refutes any possible
overbreadth arguments against the CPPA by fo-
cusing on how courts have interpreted the statute
and the intent of Congress.
I. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO
DEFINING UNPROTECTED SEXUALLY
EXPLICIT MATERIAL
A. Overview of the Categorical Approach to
the First Amendment
Under the categorical approach to the First
Amendment, government may regulate freely cer-
tain "categories" of speech because they are not
protected by the First Amendment. 24 Among
these forms of speech are: (1) speech that is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action; 25 (2) obscenity; 2 6 (3) defamation; 2 7
24 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem."); see also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The
Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context
in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1227
(1984) [hereinafter Faber & Nowak].
25 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573; Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969).
26 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Miller,
413 U.S. at 23; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54
(1973).
27 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y.
(4) false or misleading commercial speech; 28 and
(5) child pornography.29 The Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire° stated that "such ut-
terances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."31 The key phrases in Chaplin-
sky with respect to the categorical approach are
"slight social value" and "clearly outweighed by
the social interest. ' 32 If the state's interest in pro-
scribing the speech "clearly outweighs" the
speech's value, the speech may be deemed a cate-
gory of speech which does not deserve First
Amendment protection. 33
B. Obscenity as a Category of Unprotected
Speech
In Roth v. United States,3 4 the Supreme Court
held that the government could regulate the dis-
tribution and production of obscene material.35
In terms of the categorical approach, the Court
found that "implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance." 36 In light
of obscenity's low social value and the state's in-
terest in preserving a moral society, the Court
concluded that obscenity was not protected cate-
gory of speech under the First Amendment.37 In
Miller, the Court established a definition for ob-
scenity. Miller defined obscenity as material that
when taken as a whole appeals to the prurient in-
terests; portrays sexual conduct as defined by the
law in a patently offensive way; and lacks serious
literary, artistic, political and scientific value. 38
The Court also held that, with the exception of
the last requirement, the test for obscenity is
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
29 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. See generally Farber & Nowak,
supra note 24, at 1228 (summarizing the current state of the
categorical approach).
30 315 U.S. 568.
31 Id. at 572.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 345 U.S. 476.
35 Id. at 484.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 485.
38 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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viewed from the standpoint of the average person
applying contemporary community standards. 39
In other words, material that is obscene in a small
town in Illinois may not be obscene in New York
City.
Although the Supreme Court granted state leg-
islatures the ability to regulate obscenity, the
Court rejected the possibility of an outright ban
on obscenity in Stanley.40 In Stanley, the Court
struck down a Georgia statute that banned the
possession of obscene material. 4' The Georgia
statute, which banned the possession of obscenity,
unconstitutionally infringed on the right to pri-
vacy. 42 The Court held that although a legislature
could regulate the production and distribution of
obscene material, a ban on its possession in-
fringed on a right "so fundamental to our scheme
of individual liberty" that the Court could not jus-
tify the statute as a proper exercise of governmen-
tal power.43 In other words, paternalistic reasons
for regulating obscenity could not justify a state
entering private homes to control a person's
thoughts.44
C. Child Pornography and Establishing
Categorical Methodology
Mass production of child pornography did not
emerge until the early 1970s when technological
advances in photography enabled pornographic
images to be produced at little cost.45 In Ferber,
the Supreme Court revisited the categorical ap-
proach when it held that child pornography is not
protected by the First Amendment. In Ferber, the
Court upheld a New York statute prohibiting indi-
viduals from distributing material depicting chil-
dren under the age of 16 performing sexual
acts.46 According to the Court, child pornogra-
phy, like obscenity, was not protected by the First
Amendment; therefore, a state could regulate the
39 Id.
40 394 U.S. at 568.
41 Id.
42 See id.
•43, Id.
44 See id. at 565 (denying that states have the ability to
control the "moral content of a person's thoughts"). The
Court's holding in Stanley has been narrowed significantly in
passing years. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66-67 (re-
fusing to extend Stanley's privacy protection beyond the
home).
45 Stevens, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (citing REPORT OF THF
COMMISSION ON OBSCENrrY AND PORNOGRAPHY 136-43 (1970)
and ATr'y GEN.'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note
production and distribution of child pornogra-
phy.47 Further, states are given greater flexibility
to protect children by regulating the porno-
graphic images of children. 48
The categorical methodology that the Supreme
Court relied on required the Court to examine
child pornography's social value and the govern-
mental interests in regulating child pornography.
First, with respect to social value, the Court con-
cluded that the value of live performances and
photographs of children engaged in sexual activ-
ity is "exceedingly modest' if not de minimus. '" 49
Further, the Court found that there would be few,
if any, situations in which a literary, scientific or
educational reason would depend upon a sexually
explicit picture of a child.50
The Court noted several key governmental in-
terests that entitle the states "to greater leeway in
the regulation of pornographic depictions of chil-
dren."5' The Court found that the state has a
compelling interest in "safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being" of its children.5 2
Additionally, the Court noted that it would not
second guess the legislature's conclusion that
prohibiting the distribution and production of
child pornography would reduce the sexual abuse
of children. 53 Further, the Court stated that the
distribution of child pornography is "intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children" because
(1) the material permanently records the victim's
abuse and (2) the production of child pornogra-
phy depends upon its distribution.54 In other
words, the advertising and selling of child pornog-
raphy provides an economic motive for the pro-
duction of child pornography. 55
After outlining the governmental interests and
concluding that child pornography is of low social
value, the Court noted that child pornography, as
a category of unprotected speech, is consistent
11, at 130-81, 341-84).
46 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. The New York statute at issue in
Ferber specifically addressed individuals who distributed por-
nographic pictures of children in order to promote live sex-
ual performances of children. Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 756.
49 Id. at 762.
50 Id. at 762-63.
51 Id. at 756.
52 Id. at 756-57.
53 Id. at 757.
54 Id. at 759.
55 Id. at 761.
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with its prior case law.5 6 The Court mainly relied
on the principles by which a category of speech is
denied First Amendment protection. 57 To reiter-
ate, a category of speech is unprotected by the
First Amendment if the governmental interest
outweighs the value of the speech that the govern-
ment is attempting to regulate. 5 8
Upon holding child pornography was unpro-
tected speech, the Ferber Court sought to limit the
scope of child pornography. Although child por-
nography and obscenity appear to be analogous,
the Court explicitly rejected the test laid out in
Miller, finding that the Miller test was ineffective
when examining child pornography. 59 Under-
standing the Court's rejection of Miller requires a
two-part analysis. First, the Court in Ferber did not
rely on. the paternalistic interest in regulating
child pornography. 60 Second, the Court noted
the main governmental interest in regulating
child pornography is to protect the child victim. 6 1
Specifically, the Court found fault with Miller's
requirement that the work "appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person[,]" and its exemp-
tion for works with literary, artistic, scientific or
political value. 62 For instance, the effect child por-
nography has on the average person is immaterial
when compared to the psychological and physical
harm inflicted upon the young victim. 63 Likewise,
the fact that the work may have literary, artistic,
political or scientific value also is irrelevant be-
cause the child already has been abused. 64 Miller's
main fault is that its application to child pornog-
raphy does not ensure that children will not be
abused. Instead, the Miller standard as applied to
child pornography would allow some children to
be abused if the picture appealed to the average
56 Id. at 763.
57 Id. at 763-64.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 761. See also Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
60 Id. The Supreme Court's decisions holding that ob-
scenity is not protected speech focuses mainly on the state's
interest in preserving a moral society. This interest is mainly
paternalistic. In fact, this is one of the reasons the Court
struck down the statute in Stanley. The paternalistic interests
of the state cannot invade a person's home. Stanley, 394 U.S.
at 565.
61 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-62. Specifically, the Court in Fer-
ber found that: (1) states have a compelling interest in
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of its
children; (2) the distribution of child pornography is "intrin-
sically related to the sexual abuse of children"; (3) the distri-
bution of such material is an "economic motive" for produc-
ing child pornography; and (4) there is little value in child
pornography. Id.
person's prurient interests, or if the picture pos-
sessed some literary, artistic, scientific or political
value.
Nevertheless, the Ferber Court used the Miller
standard as a framework for defining the scope of
its decision. 65 It eliminated the prong in Miller re-
quiring a finding that the work appeals to the pru-
rient interests of the average person; therefore,
there is no community standard to be applied to
child pornography. 66 Also, it is not necessary to
consider whether the work, as a whole, is patently
offensive. 67 The only remaining aspect of the
Miller standard that the Court applied to child
pornography was whether the work portrays sex-
ual conduct as defined by the applicable law.68
Addressing the portrayal of sexual conduct is-
sue, the Court also limited the scope of material
encompassed in the unprotected category of child
pornography. First, the Court in Ferber held that
the statute must limit its reach to "works that visu-
ally depict sexual conduct by children below a
specified stage."6 9 Also, the Court noted that "the
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of
sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do
not involve live performance or photographic or
other visual reproduction of live performances"
remain under the First Amendment's protec-
tion. 70 Finally, the Court noted that sexual con-
duct also includes a lewd exhibition of a child's
genitals.7 1
The Supreme Court's method for establishing
child pornography as unprotected speech con-
sisted of three steps. First, the court addressed
child pornography's low social value v. 7 2 Next, the
Court distilled the governmental interests in regu-
lating child pornography and compared those in-
62 Id. at 761. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
63 See id,
64 Id.
65 Id. at 764.
66 Id.
67 Id. The Court specifically does not give an explanation
as to why it eliminated these elements of the Miller standard.
Arguably the reason is that the Court found these require-
ments irrelevant when dealing with child pornography. As
the Court stated previously, the harm to the child is done
regardless of the works value. Id. at 761.
68 Id. at 765.
69 Id. at 764 (emphasis in original).
70 Id. at 764-65. As the Court defined the term "live per-
formance" in Ferber, only live or visual depictions were pro-
hibited under the New York statute. Id.
71 Id. at 773.
72 See id. at 762.
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terests to child pornography's low social value. 73
Finally, the Court limited the material that consti-
tuted child pornography.74 This three-step analy-
sis determined that child pornography, as defined
in Ferber, was not protected under the free speech
clause.
Osborne stripped child pornography of another
constitutional right: the right to privacy. The
Court's holding in Osborne expanded the state's
ability to regulate child pornography in several
ways. 75 First, with respect to the definition of child
pornography, Osborne reaffirmed part of Ferber,
which stated that a lewd exhibition of a child's
genitals is not protected speech. 76 Although the
Court recognized that a mere picture of naked
child is protected speech, it accepted the Ohio
Supreme Court's reading of the Ohio statute as a
constitutional interpretation.7 7 The Ohio Su-
preme Court had concluded that the Ohio statute
properly could prohibit not only the possession of
lewd depictions of a child's genitals but also pic-
tures with a graphic focus on the genitals.78 Ac-
cording to this conclusion, it is constitutional to
regulate naked pictures of children even if the
children are not engaged in sexual "conduct."
In Osborne, the Court found prior law dealing
with obscenity inadequate.79 The Court held that
unlike obscenity, a state could ban completely the
possession of child pornography.8 0 Contrary to
the defendant's belief that Stanley required the
Court to strike down the statute, the Court distin-
guished Stanley because the governmental inter-
ests in proscribing child pornography were not
simply paternalistic in nature.8' In Stanley, the
Court held that Georgia's only aim in regulating
the in-home possession of obscenity was to control
a person's thought.8 2 In contrast, the Court in Os-
73 See id. at 756-63.
74 See id. at 765-73.
75 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 106. The statute in Osborne regu-
lated the possession of child pornography, but did not apply
if the individual possessing the material was the child's par-
ent or ward, or if the individual possessing the material knew
that the parent, guardian or custodian consented to the child
posing nude. Also, if the material was "for a bona fide artistic,
medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, ju-
dicial, or other proper purpose..."-provided it was viewed
by "a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher,
person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, cler-
gyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper
interest in the material or performance"-the statute did not
apply. Id.
76 Id. at 114.
77 Id. at 113-14.
borne found Ohio's reasons for regulating the pos-
session of child pornography were aimed mainly
at decreasing the exploitive use of children . 3 In
fact, the Court stated that there may even be com-
pelling reasons to prohibit the possession of ob-
scenity8 4 Nonetheless, the Court found it reason-
able for a state to ban the possession of child
pornography in hopes of eliminating the market
for child pornography and eventually its produc-
tion.8 5
Osborne also expanded the governmental inter-
ests in regulating child pornography. As men-
tioned previously, the Court acknowledged that
states may target the possession of child pornogra-
phy as a means to stop its production. 86 A total
ban on the possession of child pornography was
necessary because, as the Court noted, the exis-
tence of the underground market has made laws
restricting the production of child pornography
hard, if not impossible, to enforce.8 7 The same
holds true for laws regulating the distribution of
child pornography. Whereas laws eliminating pro-
duction are largely preventative, laws addressing
the distribution of child pornography mainly exist
to ease the psychological burden on the victims
who must accept that their image may circulate
for many years.88
Another compelling governmental interest rec-
ognized in Osborne dealt directly with the posses-
sion of child pornography. The Court found that
pedophiles sometimes use child pornography to
seduce other children.8 9 Pictures of children per-
forming sexual acts often are used by pedophiles
to entice children who are reluctant to participate
in the activity. 90 This was important to the Court's
analysis because a law stopping the possession of
child pornography would decrease the ability of
78 Id. at 113.
79 See id. at 108.
80 Id. at 111.
81 Id. at 109.
82 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66.
83 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
84 Id. at 110.
85 Id. at 109-10.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 110.
88 See id.; accord Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that
government has an interest in stopping the distribution of
child pornography because the material is a permanent re-
cord of the molestation)..
89 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
90 Id. at 11 n.7 (citing A-rr'' GEN.'S COMMISSION ON POR-
NOGRAPHY, supra note 11, at 649).
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pedophiles to abuse children.9' Without access to
child pornography, pedophiles would have a
harder time coaxing a child into performing sex-
ual acts. 92
D. Placing Obscenity and Child Pornography
on the Continuum
Although child pornography and obscenity are
both forms of sexually explicit material, the two
forms of speech are very different. The state's in-
terest in proscribing child pornography dwarfs
the state's paternalistic reasons for regulating ob-
scenity.9 3 Also, a state may regulate child pornog-
raphy more heavily than it may regulate obscen-
ity.9 4 If obscenity and child pornography are
placed on the continuum of sexually explicit ma-
terial, obscenity would be placed in the middle 95
with adult pornography and child pornography at
the two extremes. 96 Lastly, obscenity is placed in
between because it deserves some protection
under the First Amendment because the govern-
ment cannot infringe on the individual's right to
privacy simply because they view obscene mate-
rial. The question as to where virtual child por-
nography fits on the continuum now becomes
91 Id. at 109-10.
92 The Supreme Court also requires a state to include a
scienter element in its child pornography laws. Ferber, 458
U.S. at 765; see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 114 (holding that
recklessness is an appropriate scienter with respect to viewers
and possessors of child pornography); United States v. X-
Citement Video, 573 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (holding that the sci-
enter of knowing applied to the whole statute). Although
some critics rely on the holding in X-Citement Video to strike
down the CPPA, their arguments do not affect this com-
ment's contention that virtual child pornography is not pro-
tected speech. Friel, supra note 18, at 220; see also Free Speech
Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1093; Geating, supra note 18, at 402-03.
Furthermore, these arguments are flawed because they mis-
read X-Citement Video as requiring the scienter of knowledge.
The Court, however, allowed the government to prove that
the individual recklessly viewed or possessed child pornogra-
phy. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 114. See generally Chad R. Fears,
Note, Shifting the Paradigm in Child Pornography Criminaliza-
tion: United States v. Maxwell, 1998 BYU L. REv. 835 (1998)
(arguing recklessness is an appropriate mens rea for child
pornography crimes.).
93 See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (differentiating Ohio's law
banning the possession of child pornography from Stanley be-
cause protecting the victims of child pornography is more
compelling than the state's paternalistic reasons for regulat-
ing obscenity).
94 Id. at 111 (holding a state may prohibit the possession
of child pornography); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756 (stating
that states are allowed more flexibility when regulating child
pornography).
95 Placing obscenity in the middle of the continuum
more difficult. Does virtual child pornography lie
between adult pornography and obscenity, or be-
tween obscenity and real child pornography? This
distinction is important because if virtual child
pornography is more like obscenity, Congress
could not ban its possession.
E. The Child Pornography Prevention Act
Congress enacted the CPPA largely in response
to the technological advances, which occurred in
the late twentieth century.9 7 Congress found that
the new technology has made computer-gener-
ated child pornography" "virtually indistinguish-
able" from real child pornography. 99 Subsequent
to that finding, Congress concluded that com-
puter-generated child pornography has many of
the same effects on children as does child pornog-
raphy that uses actual children.' 0 For instance,
virtual child pornography (like actual child por-
nography) can be used by pedophiles to seduce
young children because a child may not be able to
distinguish between a real child and a computer-
generated child. 10' Also, Congress found that
technology has enabled producers of child por-
nography to alter innocent pictures of chil-
does not mean that obscenity is located at the exact center. It
simply means that obscenity is in between the two extremes.
How close obscenity falls to the center line is not yet clear.
Arguably, it falls closer to adult pornography than child por-
nography because it has some protection under the First
Amendment. The exact placement of obscenity, however, is
not important for this comment.
96 Adult pornography is placed at one end because in en-
joys the Constitution's full protection. In contrast, child por-
nography lacks any constitutional protection, and therefore,
it is placed at the other end of the continuum.
97 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7.
98 The CPPA did not define computer-generated child
pornography separate from its definition of child pornogra-
phy. See supra note 15 and accompanying text, quoting the
definition of child pornography.
99 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2256 (1994); see also Omnibus Con-
solidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
100 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-26 (1996).
101 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2. Congress also found that
virtual child pornography: (1) whets the sexual appetite of
child molesters and pedophiles; and (2) "creates an unwhole-
some environment which affects the psychological, mental
and emotional development of children and undermines the
efforts of parents and families to encourage the sound
mental, moral, and emotional development of children." Id.
These interests are largely paternalistic in nature and thus
ancillary to the primary reason the government is concerned
with regulating child pornography. Id.
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dren. 102
In addressing virtual child pornography, Con-
gress also created a new definition of child por-
nography in the CPPA. The CPPA defines child
pornography as "any visual depiction, including
any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer
or computer-generated image or picture . .. of
sexually explicit conduct."' 3 The term "visual de-
piction" includes images that appear to be mi-
nors,10 4 and images that are "advertised, pro-
moted, presented, described, or distributed in
such a way that conveys the impression" that the
material is of a minor. 10 5 This comment's primary
focus will be on the definition's inclusion of com-
puter-generated images. 106
The CPPA also provides an affirmative defense
for individuals charged with selling, distributing
or receiving child pornography. 10 7 The affirma-
tive defense provides that individuals charged
with distributing, reproducing or selling child
pornography must prove that the images "w[ere]
produced using an actual person or persons," as
long as the persons were adults and that the mate-
rial was not promoted as child pornography.10 8
This defense does not apply when individuals are
charged with possession of child pornography
without the intent to sell the material.109 Congress
wanted to ensure that adult pornography would
not be caught in the statute's grasp" 0 while also
ensuring that individuals possessing material they
believe is child pornography would be punished.
Indeed, the main purpose of the affirmative de-
fense is to strike down any overbreadth challenges
102 S. REP. No 104-358, at 15. For instance, an individual
could take a picture of a child model out of a clothing cata-
logue and make the child appear to be engaged in sexual
conduct.
103 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (8).
104 Id. at § 2256 (8)(a).
105 Id. at § 2256 (8)(d).
106 The "appears to be of a minor" provision actually
presents some overlap in Congress' definition. Hilton, 167
F.3d at 66. Essentially, any computer-generated picture of a
child would also classify as an image that "appears to be of a
minor." Id.
107 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (1996). Section 2252A(c)
states:
It shall be an affirmative defense ... that-(1) the al-
leged child pornography was produced using an actual
person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the mate-
rial was produced; and (3) the defendant did not adver-
tise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the mate-
rial in such a manner as to convey the impression that it
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.
to the CPPA's "appears to be" provision.111 Other-
wise, the provision inadvertently may illegalize
pornographic images of adults who look under
the age of 18.
II. VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AS A
SEPARATE CATEGORY OF
UNPROTECTED SPEECH
At the time Ferber was decided, its definition of
child pornography" 2 seemed suitable to address
the problems associated with child pornography.
Recent technological advances, however, have
made the exact definition of child pornography
hard to discern. This poses a problem in cases
where the prosecution cannot prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the image depicts a real
child.' 1 Does Ferber require the government to
prove that the images depict real children? The
short answer is it all depends on whether Ferber is
read literally or not.
From a literal standpoint, some critics of the
CPPA have argued that the term "visually" only
applies to an actual child and that the definition's
inclusion of "live performance" lends itself to the
conclusion that only child pornography that por-
trays actual children is without First Amendment
protection.1 14 On the other hand, it also could be
argued that the Court only included the term
"live performance" in Ferber because the statute at
issue focused on the distribution of child pornog-
raphy as a way to promote "live performances" of
sexual conduct.1 15 The latter argument recog-
Id. at § 2252A(c).
108 Id. at 2252A(c).
109 Id. at 2252A(c)(3), 2252(d). Whereas both
§ 2252A(a)(4) and § 2252A(a)(5) address possession, the
sections distinguish individuals who intend to sell the mate-
rial from individuals who possess the material for personal
satisfaction.
ISo S. REP. No. 104-358, at 21.
111 Id.
112 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (categorizing child pornogra-
phy as "works that visually depict sexual conduct by chil-
dren").
113 See supra text accompanying note 14.
114 Geating, supra note 18, at 395 (arguing Ferber's defini-
tion of child pornography only applies to images involving
real children).
115 One author defines child pornography as "photo-
graphs of actual children engaged in some sort of sexual ac-
tivity either with adults or with other children." Friel, supra
note 18, at 217. This definition is flawed because it places too
much emphasis on the participation of two or more individu-
als. In fact, it bears a closer resemblance to the definition of
obscenity than child pornography. Material is obscene only if
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nizes a connection between the interests outlined
in Ferber and Congress' reasons for regulating vir-
tual child pornography. The problem with the
second argument is that when defining child por-
nography, Ferber mainly relied on the abuse of
children that occurs when child pornography is
produced.' 16 The production of virtual child por-
nography, however, does not involve the direct
sexual abuse of children.
The problem of applying the Ferber definition to
virtual child pornography is further complicated
because, as the Ninth Circuit held in Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno,'1 7 Ferber put forth the idea of us-
ing someone above the legal age who looks
younger, when a child's pornographic image is
needed for literary or artistic reasons.1 1 " Although
the Supreme Court found that it was immaterial
to the child depicted in the image whether the
image had any artistic, literary, scientific or politi-
cal value, the same cannot be said for virtual child
pornography. Because computer-generated por-
nography is not created using sexually abused
children, the Supreme Court's reasoning for ex-
cluding speech that has literary, artistic, scientific
or political value does not apply.1 1 9 Although ap-
plying Ferber's definition of child pornography to
virtual child pornography is difficult and requires
too much guesswork, this does not lead to the
conclusion that virtual child pornography does
not fit into the First Amendment; it simply means
that virtual child pornography does not fit into
the category of unprotected speech outlined in
Ferber. Virtual child pornography, however, may
be a new category of unprotected speech brought
there is sexual conduct performed by two or more individu-
als. Child pornography is not under a similar restriction. In
contrast, the Supreme Court has held that a graphic focus of
a child's genitals is not protected speech. Osborne, 495 U.S. at
113.
116 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (noting that the various excep-
tions to the obscenity test do not apply in situations where a
child is sexually exploited).
117 198 F.3d 1083.
118 Id. at 1092; see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763.
119 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762-63.
120 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA
AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 2.09 (1994) [hereinafter SMOLLA & NIM-
MER] (describing several key theories on the First Amend-
ment). Among these theories are the heightened scrutiny,
the ad hoc balancing approach and absolutism). With the ex-
ception of absolutism, all of these theories allow for certain
types of speech to be proscribed. Under absolutism the gov-
ernment can never restrict an individual's right to free
speech. Id. at § 2.10.
about by technological advances in the late 20"'
century. Determining whether virtual child por-
nography is a new category of unprotected speech
requires an examination of its value and harm to
society. As will be shown, the evils that virtual por-
nography perpetuates in society outweigh its low
social value, placing it outside the First Amend-
ment.
III. VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AS
LOW-VALUE SPEECH
Any debate about the First Amendment begins
with a discussion about what the Framers of the
Constitution intended to protect.120 The Supreme
Court has held that government cannot prohibit
speech simply because it does not agree with the
idea behind the speech.1 21 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has held that speech may be,
proscribed if it is directed at inciting illegal con-
duct, 122 is libelous 123 or obscene.1 24 One of the
most popular theories describing the First
Amendment's purpose is the marketplace theory.
John Milton eloquently stated the heart of this
theory when he wrote, "[T] hough all the winds of
doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licens-
ing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let
her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth
put to the worse, in a free and open encoun-
ter?" 125 Proponents of this theory 26 argue that
freedom of speech is necessary because only in an
unfettered marketplace of ideas can truth ulti-
mately be discovered.12 7
121 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416-18
(1989) (holding Texas law forbidding the burning of the flag
.was unconstitutional); see also Terminello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (holding a function of speech is to invite
dispute). See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 2-3 (1998) (briefly discussing the Supreme Court's de-
sire to protect free speech regardless of the unpleasantness
surrounding the message that the speech purports).
122 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 487 (stating that a govern-
ment can punish speech if it is directed at inciting an immi-
nent serious harm and that result is likely to occur).
123 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (holding that states could enact
laws to protect private individuals from libel).
124 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (refusing to grant obscenity First
Amendment protection).
125 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 120, at § 2.15.
126 Oliver Wendell HolmesJohn Milton andJohn Stuart
Mills are all supporters of this theory. Id.
127 See generally C. Thomas Dienes, Wen the First Amend-
ment is not Preferred: The Militay and Other "Special Contexts, " 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 786-89 (1988) (utilizing Robert S.
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Justice Holmes, a supporter of marketplace the-
ory, did not believe in absolute truth.12 8 Rather,
Holmes recognized that if the speech
"threaten[ed] immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country,"
such speech may be constrained by govern-
ment. 29 In other words, marketplace theory ben-
efits society not necessarily because absolute truth
is realized but because its greatest asset is its abil-
ity to provide the best test of truth.' 30 Melville
Nimmer and Rodney Smolla in their treatise on
the First Amendment stated that a better way to
view marketplace theory is "not as a guarantor of
the final conquest of truth, but rather as a defense
of the process of an open marketplace."' 3' Essen-
tially, marketplace theory operates not to ensure
that only one viewpoint survives, but that the pro-
cess has shown that only one viewpoint has value.
When applying the theory to virtual child por-
nography, it becomes clear that virtual child por-
nography is not necessary to reach any ultimate
truth. First, child pornography has little value ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Ferber.'3 2 Just as
pictures depicting the sexual conduct of actual
children lack any social value, virtual child por-
nography also has little or no value. Simply be-
cause the children depicted in virtual child por-
nography are entirely fictitious does not increase
the idea's value to society.' 3 3 Virtual child pornog-
raphy is not necessary for the "exposition of
ideas."1 3 4 Thus, if the idea behind real child por-
nography-the sexual exploitation of children-
is not afforded any protection by the First Amend-
Marx's remarks to explain the philosophical underpinnings
of marketplace theory).
128 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L.
REv. 40, 40 (1918).
129 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
130 SMOLLA & NiMMER, supra note 120, at § 2:19.
131 Id.
132 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
133 Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1100 (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting).
134 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
135 Free Speech Coalition, 198 F,3d at 1094.
136 This, in essence, is the underlying philosophy behind
the categorical approach to the First Amendment and mar-
ketplace theory. Although marketplace theory does not ex-
plicitly state what "categories" of speech should be denied
protection, its application results in the exclusion of certain
categories of speech from the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
ment, the idea behind virtual child pornography
should be unprotected as well.
In Free Speech Coalition, the Ninth Circuit held
that absent some nexus showing that computer-
generated images cause the same harm to chil-
dren as real child pornography, the fact that vir-
tual child pornography lacks social value is not
enough to label it as unprotected speech.1 35
There are, however, two significant problems with
the Ninth Circuit's analysis. First, the Supreme
Court has recognized in past decisions that
speech with little social value can be denied First
Amendment protection. I6 For example, because
obscenity lacked social value, it was not necessary
to protect it to ensure that truth could be recog-
nized in the marketplace of ideas. 13 7 If the Su-
preme Court labeled obscenity as unprotected
speech, certainly virtual child pornography
(which, unlike obscenity, has the possibility of
harming children) 3" also should be considered
unprotected speech. Second, as this comment will
discuss later, there is a nexus between the harm
caused by using real children and the harm
caused by images of computer-generated chil-
dren. Therefore, even under the more relaxed
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in Free
Speech Coalition, virtual child pornography also
does not qualify for First Amendment protection.
Just as virtual child pornography's lack of social
value can be compared to the social value of ac-
tual child pornography, the governmental inter-
ests in banning virtual child pornography mimic
the interests laid out by the Supreme Court in Fer-
ber and Osborne.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (upholding a law prohibiting
speech that may cause a breach of the peace); Miller, 413 U.S.
at 23 (reaffirming that obscenity is not protected by the First
Amendment); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (holding that libelous
material may be regulated); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
563-66 (recognizing that the state may restrict the commer-
cial speech that is misleading and false). Whereas market-
place theory and the categorical approach rest on the
speech's value, both approaches reject the idea that the gov-
ernment can regulate speech simply because the majority re-
jects the idea behind the speech. It is not the idea behind the
speech that allows government to regulate it, but instead, the
low value the speech possesses. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 754 (quot-
ing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
137 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
138 Even opponents of the CPPA have recognized the po-
tential for harm. Burke, supra note 18, at 461; see also, Friel,
supra note 18, at 229.
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IV. VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
ITS HARM TO SOCIETY
There is no question that virtual child pornog-
raphy, which relies on computer-generated
images, is different from real child pornography
because no child is harmed in the production of
virtual child pornography. This distinction, how-
ever, does not change the argument that virtual
child pornography is not protected under the
First Amendment. Although the regulation of vir-
tual child pornography encompasses a handful of
compelling governmental interests, 139 among the
most compelling are its ability to be utilized to se-
duce children and to hinder the law enforcement
of child pornography. 140
A. Seduction Argument
Congress found,141 and many scholars and
courts have agreed, that technology has made
computer-generated images "virtually indistin-
guishable" from images of real people.1 42 This
finding, coupled with the fact that child pornog-
raphy is used to seduce children into performing
illegal sexual acts, 14 3 leads to the conclusion that
virtual child pornography also can be used to se-
duce children.' 44 A young child who is reluctant
139 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2. Specifically, Congress
found: (1) computer-generated images depicting an identifi-
able minor intrudes on the child's privacy and reputational
interests; (2) computer-generated images whet the sexual ap-
petites of pedophile and child molesters; and (3) virtual
child pornography also can be used to seduce a child unable
to distinguish the real from the imaginary.
140 Id. at 2, 20.
141 Id. at 2.
142 Id.
143 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (finding that pedophiles use
child pornography to seduce reluctant children); see also
Wendy L. Pursel, Comment, Computer-Generated Child Pornog-
raphy: A Legal Alternative?, 22 SEATrLE UNIV. L. REv. 643, 661
(1998) (commenting that other authors are incorrect and
that a real material danger may ensue, including inducing
children to engage in sexual acts).
144 S. REP. No 104-358, at 2.
145 See also, Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 n.7 (citing A-rr'v
GEN.'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 11, at 649).
Dr. Shirley O'Brien described the seduction process in the
following steps summarized in the Senate's Report:
(1) [C]hild pornographic material is shown to a child
for 'educational purposes'; (2) an attempt is made to
convince a child that explicit sex is acceptable, even de-
sirable; (3) the child is convinced that other children
are sexually active and that such conduct is okay; (4)
child pornography desensitizes the child, lowering the
child's inhibitions; (5) some of these sessions progress to
sexual activity involving the child; (6) photographs or
to participate in sexual conduct may be per-
suaded to do so upon seeing a picture of another
child engaged in the same activity.' 45 If adults
cannot decipher the difference between actual
and computer-generated children, a young child
in a vulnerable situation also will not be able to
make the distinction. 146 The result is that while
virtual child pornography may not harm a child
when it is created, it still may lead to the sexual
abuse of children.
Several opponents have criticized Congress' ar-
gument that virtual child pornography leads to se-
duction as too speculative. 147 Brenda M. Simon
compares this seduction argument 148 to the asser-
tion that pornography causes men to rape wo-
men. 149 Further, she suggests that using this ratio-
nale punishes pedophiles before they commit a
crime.15 0 In other words, banning virtual child
pornography "punish[es] thought rather than ac-
tion." 151 Her comparison to rape is flawed for two
reasons. First, the rape analogy does not rest on
the same premise as the contention that child
pornography is used to seduce children. Second,
her arguments ignore the Supreme Court's find-
ing in Osborne that child pornography is used to
seduce children. 52
Analyzing the effects that pornography has on
films are taken of sexual activity; and (7) this new child
pornographic material is used to attract and seduce yet
more child victims.
S. REP. No. 104-358, at 14.
146 See generally Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
147 E.g., Simon, supra note 18, at 394; see also, Friel, supra
note 18, at 228.
148 The secondary effects argument is essentially the
same as the seduction argument. The main gist is that no
child is affected directly in the production but that children
are hurt indirectly.
149 Simon, supra note 18, at 394. Simon also mentions
that no current statute bans the use of adult pornography for
that reason. See infra text accompanying note 153.
15o Simon, supra note 18, at 395. In fact, Simon suggests
only punishing those who actually commit the crime. Id. The
thought of waiting until a child molester actual hurts a child,
however, is problematic and contrary to Supreme Court rul-
ings. Ferber denied child pornography protection largely be-
cause of the harm it causes the victim. Essentially, a state's
ability to regulate child pornography stems from the belief
that a state's interest in protecting children is so great that
the legislature should be able to employ preventive measures.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
151 Simon, supra note 18, at 395.
152 Simon's rape analogy does not address the use of
child pornography to seduce children. She does not assert
that pornography is used by men to seduce unconsenting wo-
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the perpetrators of both rape and child molesta-
tion, in an effort to give computer-generated por-
nography First Amendment protection, is illogi-
cal. The activity depicted in pictures of nude
adults engaging in sexual activity is not illegal; pic-
tures of children engaging in sexual acts repre-
sents illegal conduct a child can never knowingly
consent to perform.
Moreover, adult pornography is not used to se-
duce unwilling adults into performing sexual acts
in the same way that child pornography is used to
seduce children. Pornography may increase an
adult's sexual desire and therefore increase their
likelihood of fulfilling those desires with a certain
individual. That, however, is vastly different from
a child molester enticing a child into performing
illegal sexual acts. In the latter instance, child mo-
lesters can use the computer-generated material
to convince the child that other children have fun
when engaged in what is illegal sexual conduct.
The difference is that an adult has the mental
awareness to say no, whereas a child lacks the abil-
ity to consent. 1 53
The argument that it is too speculative to assert
that virtual child pornography will be used to se-
duce children also fails because the Supreme
Court already has recognized that possibility as a
valid reason to outlaw child pornography. In Os-
borne, the Court took considered evidence that
showed child pornography may be used to seduce
children and relied on this finding as a reason to
outlaw the possession of child pornography. 154
Therefore, the argument that Congress cannot
regulate speech based on speculation fails, partly
because the Supreme Court, 155 the Congress' 56
and the Justice Department 15 7 all have recognized
men to engage in sexual conduct. Child pornography, how-
ever, is used by child molesters to seduce children. S. REP.
No. 104-358 at 2.
153 See generally Simon, supra note 18, at 394 (stressing
that adult pornography can also be used to seduce children);
cf, Lydia W. Lee, Note, Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996: Confronting the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. CAL. IN-
TERDISC. L.J. 639, 656-57 (1999) (examining a study by Reu-
ben Lang and Roy Frenzel, which showed that 6-15% of the
pedophiles they studied used adult pornography to seduce
children (citing Rueben A. Lang & Roy R. Frenzel, How Sex
Offenders Lure Children, 1 ANNALS SEx RES. 303, 309 (1988))).
Lee relied on this study as support for the proposition that
virtual child pornography can be used to seduce children.
She justified the small percentage by stating that in terms of
the number of children molested by pedophiles in the study,
that percentage represented the sexual abuse of five to eight
this possibility as a reality in child pornography
cases.
Finally, the connection between computer-gen-
erated images and pictures of actual children per-
forming illegal sexual acts has been attacked by
some critics on the grounds that society should be
conscious of the fact that the camera can lie.'15
The chief problem with this theory is that it forces
children to accept facts that even the adult popu-
lation has not realized. While it is noble to suggest
that adults in today's society must learn to accept
that technology has destroyed the meaning be-
hind the phrase "the camera does not lie," 159 the
fact remains that a child may not be able to distin-
guish images presented as real or computer gen-
erated. This is especially true when considering
that this child most likely will not have entered
puberty"!" and is possibly in a situation where a
trusted adult may attempt to molest him or her.
B. Law Enforcement
The scales tip further in favor of denying virtual
child pornography First Amendment protection
because to hold otherwise would frustrate the
proper enforcement of laws that prohibit the pos-
session of child pornography. It would be difficult
for police officers to distinguish between child
pornography that involves actual children and
that which is computer generated and involves no
children.161 Although it may seem drastic to elimi-
nate virtual child pornography completely in or-
der to help law enforcement, the harm exper-
ienced by the child victim of sexual molestation
dwarfs the slight value of the material. Congress
has stated that "[t]he Government's inability to
children. See Lee, this note, at 657.
154 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
155 Id. One author differentiates Osborne because he
finds virtual child pornography to be unprotected speech. See
Geating, supra note 18, at 400. This argument does not apply
when attempting to define virtual child pornography as a
new category of unprotected speech because the correct
analysis is to balance the harm the speech has on society with
its value.
156 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
157 A-rr'y GEN.'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra
note 11, at 649.
158 Friel, supra note 18, at 236-37.
159 Id.
160 See S. REP. No. 104-358, at Parts [V.A, C.
16' S. R'I,. No. 104-358, at 16.
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detect or prove the use of real children in the pro-
duction of child pornography ... could have the
effect of increasing the sexually abusive and ex-
ploitive use of children to produce child pornog-
raphy." 162 In other words, the true reason for de-
nying virtual child pornography First Amendment
protection is not to help the government convict
pedophiles, but to help police stop pedophiles
before they harm young children.
The First Circuit in Hilton found that where in-
dividuals can create an image that looks like a real
child, the same technology can make a picture of
a real child appear computer generated.1 63 Thus,
if virtual child pornography is considered pro-
tected speech, prosecutors would be faced with a
dilemma in prosecuting people who possess child
pornography: they might not be able to prove that
the image depicts an actual child. This inability to
distinguish real children from computer-gener-
ated children would create a reasonable doubt as
to the origin of the picture. Individuals might es-
cape not only conviction but also arrest because
law enforcement would not know whether the
images are of real or computer-generated chil-
dren.
One critic argues that there should be a rebut-
table presumption that the image depicts an ac-
tual child. 164 Although there are several problems
with this proposal, 65 the most important may be
the failure of the proposal to recognize the harm
that virtual child pornography inflicts on chil-
dren. Some opponents of denying First Amend-
ment protection to virtual child pornography re-
162 Id. at 20.
163 Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73.
164 Friel, supra note 18, at 209 (shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove that the image did not involve an actual
minor); see S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17 (recognizing that some
critics believe that images that do not portray real children
should not be protected).
165 In the criminal arena, it is always the government and
not the defendant who must prove the elements of the crime.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n. 31 (1975) (explain-
ing that generally the prosecution bears the burden of proof
unless aided by a presumption or a permissible inference).
However, with a rebuttable presumption that the image de-
picts an actual child, there is a possibility that the innocent
will be convicted because they cannot disprove the presump-
tion. It is almost impossible to prove that the images are com-
puter generated. Individuals will be arrested for possessing
child pornography even though the image does not depict
an actual child. Assuming these individuals actually can prove
the image was created on a computer, they still will be forced
to deal with the social stigma associated with pedophilia. In
essence, the individuals will be punished even though they
fuse to recognize the connection between. virtual
child pornography and child molestation. 166 As
this comment has demonstrated, there is a strong
link between virtual child pornography and the
sexual abuse of children.
Professor Debra Burke, an opponent of the
CPPA, recognizes the possibility that virtual child
pornography may cause harm to children.167 Nev-
ertheless, Burke maintains that the Constitution
requires that the danger to children posed by vir-
tual child pornography be imminent. 6 This ar-
gument is disturbing, especially because Burke
herself admits virtual child pornography may not
only provoke pedophiles to molest children but
also validate and aid their actions.' 69 Under her
argument, children would continue to fall victim
to sexual molestation and the government would
be unable to stop the abuse because pedophiles
did not act promptly after viewing virtual child
pornography.
Moreover, Burke's argument also fails because,
as the First Circuit stated in Hilton, the Supreme
Court has given the government considerable lee-
way in dealing with child pornography because of
the severe effects that it has on the nation's chil-
dren.1 70 In light of the need to protect the na-
tion's children from sexual abuse, law enforce-
ment cannot afford to guess whether an image
seized as evidence is real or computer generated.
Law enforcement must be given the power to ar-
rest individuals who possess child pornography
whether or not the images they possess are real or
computer generated. Because the government
did not commit a crime. Lastly, as this comment will illus-
trate, this proposal ignores the harms caused by virtual child
pornography.
166 Eg., Simon, supra note 18, at 394. But see, Friel, supra
note 18, at 228.
167 Burke, supra note 18, at 461.
168 Id.
169 Id. ("Virtual child pornography may encourage, pro-
mote, persuade, or influence pedophiles to engage in illegal
conduct with children, it may validate their illegal activity,
and it may assist in their illegal activity.").
170 Hilton, 167 F.3d at 70-73 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at
756). Although the courts have not defined the precise lee-
way afforded to a state, it is not necessary to know the precise
limits of a state's authority in order to rebut Burke's argu-
ment. Particularly, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the "leeway" granted to states encompasses the state's right to
prohibit the possession of child pornography because it may
be used to seduce children. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111. This
argument, as this comment maintains, can be extended to
include virtual child pornography, which also can be used to
seduce children.
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has flexibility in regulating child pornography
and because the value of such material is slight,
the need for effective law enforcement trumps the
right of an individual to possess virtual child por-
nography.
The ability for government to outlaw child por-
nography in order to assist law enforcement is not
a new concept. The Supreme Court endorsed this
notion in both Ferber and Osborne when it accepted
that Congress may proscribe certain activities with
the ultimate purpose of abolishing the produc-
tion of and market for child pornography. In Fer-
ber, the Court found that prohibiting the advertis-
ing and selling of child pornography was a
reasonable means for stopping its production.' 7'
Likewise, the Court in Osborne accepted that a
complete ban on the possession of child pornog-
raphy is a necessary means to expel the market for
child pornography. 72 It would be almost impossi-
ble for government to address the problem of
child molestation simply by attempting to stop
only the production of child pornography that
uses real children.
When faced with the task of eliminating the sex-
ual abuse of children in today's technology-driven
society, government must be given the ability to
outlaw virtual child pornography. Although vir-
tual child pornography is different from the situa-
tions that the Court addressed in Ferber and Os-
borne, it is similar in the sense that one of the main
reasons for proscribing the advertising, selling
and possession of child pornography is to help
government reduce the problem of child molesta-
tion. Similarly, allowing government the ability to
freely regulate virtual child pornography should
decrease the number of children victimized by
sexual abuse.
Critics of the CPPA argues that allowing virtual
171 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62.
172 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10 ("It is also surely reasona-
ble for the State to conclude that it will decrease the produc-
tion of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess
and view the product, thereby decreasing demand."); see also
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62. The Ferber Court stated:
The advertising and selling of child pornography pro-
vide an economic motive for and are thus an integral
part of the production of such materials, an activity ille-
gal throughout the Nation. 'It rarely has been suggested
that the constitutional freedom for speech and press ex-
tends its immunity to speech or writing used as an inte-
gral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal stat-
ute.'
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62.
7-3 See Friel, supra note 18, at 225.
child pornography will decrease the number of
sexually abused children because pedophiles will
use computer-generated images rather than
images of actual children. 173 Further, they argue
that those who produce child pornography only
for the money will refrain from abusing children
because they can use a computer to create porno-
graphic images of children. 174 Both of these asser-
tions fail for several reasons. First, neither argu-
ment is supported by studies showing the ability
to generate child pornography on a computer will
significantly reduce the number of children
abused in the production of child pornography or
that a pedophile actually will be satisfied if he
knows the image is not of a real child. Second,
these arguments fail to address the fact that law
enforcement must have the ability to eliminate
certain tools, such as virtual child pornography,
that could be used by child molesters to seduce a
child.' 75 Finally, the assertion that pedophiles
would begin to look at virtual child pornography
rather than pornography using real children is
based on the unfounded premise that all child
pornography portraying actual children could be
eliminated.176 This assertion also incorrectly as-
sumes that future child pornography will be en-
tirely computer generated. Effective enforcement
of child pornography laws only can be accom-
plished if government has the ability to monitor
both the virtual and actual pornography.
V. THE LIMITS OF VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE CPPA'S
OVERBREADTH
Although virtual child pornography is not in-
cluded in Ferber's definition of child pornography,
applying the Ferber standards will help define the
174 Id. at 227 (noting that financially motivated child
pornographers will see virtual child pornography as a more
economical and legal alternative).
175 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756 ("States are entitled to
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions
of children."); see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10 (recogniz-
ing that states need the ability to ban the possession of child
pornography in order to decrease demand and, in turn, pro-
duction).
176 As the Court found in Ferber, one of the reasons to
prohibit the distribution of child pornography is to prevent a
child from going through life knowing that his or her image
is circulating among pedophiles. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10.
The Ferber Court further stated that the only means of stop-
ping the sexual exploitation of children is to halt the distri-
bution of child pornography. Id. at 759-60.
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limits of virtual child pornography as a category of
speech unprotected by the First Amendment. In
Ferber, the Court defined child pornography as
"works that visually depict sexual conduct by chil-
dren."1 77 The term "conduct" included lewd exhi-
bitions of a child's genitals as not protected by the
First Amendment. 178 This definition of child por-
nography can apply equally to virtual child por-
nography so long as "visually" is read as limiting
the type of medium used to display child pornog-
raphy rather than the nature of the child de-
picted. In other words, the term "visually" only
should require that a picture be involved and
should not restrict the subject depicted in the pic-
ture only to an actual child.
The justification for limiting the category of un-
protected speech to pictures addresses the con-
cern among critics of the CPPA that drawings,
paintings and sculptures still should be protected
by the First Amendment. 179 Although these critics
would exempt all virtual child pornography-ar-
guing that a computer-generated image is more
like a drawing or painting than a picture of a real
child-that argument is not persuasive when com-
paring the significant societal harm of virtual
child pornography to its nonexistent social
value. 180 Although a computer-generated image is
created from a vision in a person's mind just like a
drawing or painting, it is the reality of the image
that connects a virtual picture to a picture depict-
ing a real child. It is this reality that makes virtual
child pornography more like real child pornogra-
phy because it is "virtually indistinguishable" from
the real child pornography, which is already ille-
gal. While a child can look at a painting or a draw-
ing and conclude that the picture is not real, a
child cannot easily distinguish a computer-gener-
ated picture from reality. The result is that virtual
child pornography can be used just like porno-
graphic images depicting real children to seduce
177 Id. at 764.
178 Id. at 765.
179 See Simon, supra note 18, at 400 (citing Ferber, 458
U.S. at 762-63); Friel, supra note 18, at 242 n.240.
180 See Simon, supra note 18, at 400; see also Friel, supra
note 18, at 242 (exemplifying the arguments criticizing the
CPPA).
181 See generally Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651 (holding "ap-
pears to be" language only applies to images virtually indis-
tinguishable from the actual child pornography). See also S.
REP. No. 104-358 at 7.
182 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7.
an unwilling child, thus removing virtual child
pornography from the First Amendment's scope.
Further, because the harm that virtual child
pornography inflicts depends upon its likeness to
actual child pornography, virtual child pornogra-
phy can be classified as unprotected speech only if
it is virtually indistinguishable from actual child
pornography. The legislative history of the CPPA
illustrates that Congress intended to regulate only
computer-generated images that are "virtually in-
distinguishable" from pictures portraying real
children. 1" Congress' main concern when enact-
ing the CPPA was that the effect of computer-gen-
erated child pornography would be the same as
pornographic material that depicts real children
because it is almost impossible to tell the differ-
ence between the two types of pictures. 82 There-
fore, the only computer-generated child pornog-
raphy images that should be outside the First
Amendment are those "virtually indistinguish-
able" from real child pornography.
In Hilton, the First Circuit recognized that if vir-
tual child pornography possesses any literary, ar-
tistic, scientific or political value, it should retain
First Amendment protection. 18 3 The Supreme
Court in Ferber refused to exempt images with lit-
erary, artistic, scientific or political value from the
definition of child pornography because the value
of the image is immaterial to the child abused
during the production of actual child pornogra-
phy. 8 4 Virtual child pornography, however, does
not pose the same threat because a real child is
not harmed during the production of the mate-
rial. Further, the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that when there existed a reason to display a por-
nographic image of a child, the producers of that
image could use an adult who looked like a
child.185 This logic suggests that virtual child por-
nography may be an acceptable means for individ-
uals to produce child pornography for literary or
183 Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74. The First Circuit did not ad-
dress any details with regard to an exception for material
with literary, artistic, political or scientific value. It simply
noted that in light of Ferber's suggestion that an individual
above the legal age could be used if necessary for literary or
artistic purposes, the "appears to be provision" of the CPPA
may unconstitutionally restrict speech. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court opined that the limited incidences in which the excep-
tion would apply did not require holding the CPPA unconsti-
tutional. Id.
184 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
185 See id. at 763.
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artistic purposes. In light of Ferber's reasoning,
computer-generated images should not be seen as
unprotected speech if the images possess discern-
able literary, artistic, scientific or political value.
The appropriate scope of virtual child pornog-
raphy that is outside the First Amendment's pro-
tection should include only images that visually
depict either a child engaged in sexual conduct
or a lewd exhibition of a child's genitals. Further,
this category of unprotected virtual child pornog-
raphy should be limited to images that are virtu-
ally indistinguishable from actual child pornogra-
phy. Finally, if the image does not involve a real
child, and if the image possesses some literary, ar-
tistic, scientific or political value, it should be pro-
tected by the First Amendment. In applying this
definition to the CPPA, it is clear that the CPPA
does not define virtual child pornography in a
manner consistent with this proposed definition.This inconsistency in the CPPA presents possi-
ble overbreadth problems. 18 6 The overbreadth
doctrine exists primarily to ensure that laws do
not chill free speech by stopping individuals from
exercising their First Amendment rights out of
fear of criminal prosecution. In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,'8 7 the Supreme Court held that the
overbreadth doctrine only should be used when
the alleged legislative overbreadth is "substan-
tial .. . in relation to the statute's plainly legiti-
mate sweep."' 88 This rule is "strong medicine"
and should be used "sparingly and only as a last
resort."'" If it is at all possible for a court to apply
a limiting construction to the statute, the statute
will not be held as overbroad."'11
Applying this standard, it is easy to view the
CPPA as constitutional. First, the legislative his-
tory clearly indicates Congress sought only to ban
computer-generated images that are virtually in-
distinguishable from actual child pornography. 1"11
Second, the main problem with the CPPA is that
it does not exempt images with literary, artistic,
scientific or political value. The First Circuit in
Hilton noted that "even if a statute at its margins
186 Before beginning the overbreadth analysis, it is im-
portant to note briefly two parts of the CPPA's definition of
child pornography related to virtual images. The definition
includes (1) images created on a computer and (2) images
that generally appear to be of a minor. Both of these provi-
sions encompass virtual child pornography. Omnibus Con-
solidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121, 110 Stat. 3009-27-28 (1996).
187 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
infringes on protected activity, the solution is not
invalidation of the entire scheme."192 A case-by-
case analysis of any computer-generated image
that falls into one of the above categories should
be sufficient to cure that part of the statute's po-
tential overbreadth. The Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Ferber supports the case-by-case approach,
especially where the statute's "legitimate reach
dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications."1 93
Finally, the CPPA's affirmative defense provides
for the possibility that its phrase "appears to be"
in its definition of child pornography may catch
some adult pornography in the statute's grasp. Al-
though the defense does not address virtual
images of adults, it does provide a defense for
those individuals marketing adult pornography
that also depicts a person who does not look over
the age of eighteen, so long as the image is not
marketed as child pornography. 94 This allows
producers of adult pornography to continue to
produce and sell pictures of actual adults engaged
in sexual activity. The only burden imposed by the
CPPA is that the producers of adult pornography
should confirm an individual's age before any pic-
tures are taken. 9 5 Checking someone's identifica-
tion is a small price to pay to protect the nation's
children from the harm posed by virtual child
pornography.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proper place for virtual child pornography
on the continuum of sexually explicit material is
next to actual child pornography, which are both
outside First Amendment protection as impermis-
sible speech. Virtual child pornography and ac-
tual child pornography are nearly identical in ap-
pearance, value and harm. The only difference
between these two types of pornography is that
one directly abuses children in its production and
the other indirectly harms children. In both cases,
however, children are harmed. The sexual harms
that virtual child pornography inflicts on children
188 Id. at 615.
119 Id. at 613.
199 See id.
191 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7.
192 Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 488 (1988)).
193 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
194 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c).
195 See id.
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far outweigh any alleged social value. For this rea-
son, virtual child pornography should be catego-
rized as unprotected speech outside the First
Amendment.
Because there are differences between virtual
and actual child pornography, virtual child por-
nography must be considered a new category of
unprotected speech for First Amendment pur-
poses. This new category of unprotected speech
should be limited to pictures that visually depict
children engaging in sexual conduct or that por-
tray a lewd exhibition of a child's genitals. Fur-
thermore, this new category of unprotected
speech does not permit government to regulate
drawings or paintings of children, and it does not
permit government to proscribe computer-gener-
ated images of children that have literary, artistic,
scientific or political value. Although the CPPA
does not set out a definition of virtual child por-
nography similar to what is proposed here, it is a
valid attempt to regulate child pornography. The
Supreme Court has given the government flexibil-
ity to enact laws aimed at stopping the sexual
abuse of children. The CPPA is simply the next
logical step in eradicating the sexual abuse of chil-
dren-conduct that is not contemplated as free-
dom of speech in the First Amendment.
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